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As organizations extend the online delivery of services and data across departmental, organizational, and even
jurisdictional boundaries, they must trust that they can identify and authenticate the customers, businesses,
employees, and third parties using them. Traditional approaches to identity management (IDM), such as documents,
clearly don‘t work in the online world, yet to date there is no online equivalent of the passport or photo-id. Instead,
organizations have established their own identity management practices. As a result, IT managers are looking for
more holistic and standardized IDM practices that could simplify access to multiple services and enable
organizations to collaborate and cooperate across global organizational boundaries, as well as keep identity
information secure and private. This article explores these IDM challenges and how managers are approaching this
issue. It discusses the key management components of IDM looking first at the basic concepts of IDM, its essential
elements, and organizational stakeholders. Next, it examines why IDM is increasingly a business concern, in
addition to an IT concern and describes the key IDM challenges facing IT managers. It then distils key principles of
effective IDM and makes recommendations for how IT managers can improve on their current IDM efforts.
Keywords: identity management, federated identity management, authentication and authorization, identity
standards, deperimiterization, identity life cycle
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I. INTRODUCTION
As organizations increasingly extend the online delivery of their services and data across departmental,
organizational, and even jurisdictional boundaries, they must trust that they can identify and authenticate the
customers, businesses, employees, and third parties using them. Traditional approaches to identity management,
such as documents, clearly don‘t work in the online world, yet to date there is no online equivalent of the passport or
photo-id. Instead, each organization and sometimes individual programs within organizations, have established a
variety of identity management practices, such as passwords or ―shared secret‖ questions.
However, as the integration of data and services progresses, IT managers are trying to grapple with more holistic
and standardized approaches to identity and authentication that could simplify access to multiple services and
enable organizations to collaborate and cooperate across global organizational boundaries to deliver services. As
well, since all organizations must be concerned with identity theft and fraud, managers are continually challenged to
implement practices that keep identity information secure and private.
Identity management (IDM) typically includes controls to prevent, detect, or correct harmful events and steps to:
identify a user; authenticate or prove the user is who he says he is; authorize what types of information can be
accessed; and account for what a user does. Effective identity management is, therefore, widely seen as being an
essential component for the safe and secure delivery of online information and services. Furthermore, as work
extends to mobile and virtual activities, more and more identity management frameworks and standards need to
integrate with a variety of devices, platforms, and protocols.
To explore the challenges of IDM that organizations are currently facing and to better understand how they are
approaching this issue, both internally and collaboratively with other organizations, the authors convened a focus
group of senior IT managers from organizations in a variety of industries. In preparation for this session, we asked
them to consider a number of questions about IDM in their organization. These questions included: the scope of
IDM; the business case for IDM; how it is organized and governed; the roles and responsibilities that are involved;
key challenges and major obstacles; and best practices or principles of effective implementation.
This article discusses the key management components of IDM, as opposed to its technical components. It looks
first at the basic concepts of IDM, its essential elements, and organizational stakeholders. Next, it looks more deeply
into why IDM is increasingly a business concern, in addition to an IT concern. Third, it describes the key challenges
facing IT managers as they try to address the rapidly evolving needs for IDM in their organizations. Fourth, it distills
some key principles of effective IDM, and, finally, it makes several recommendations for IT managers about how
they can improve on their current IDM efforts.

II. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT (IDM) BASICS
Almost all of us recognize and are familiar with some of the basic concepts of identity management, even if we are
not aware of it. Most IDM frameworks recognize three main components [Smith, 2007; Allan and Perkins, 2009;
Aitoro, 2008]:
1. Registration or Identification. These are processes that answer the question: ―Who are you?‖ Whether we are
employees, customers, or citizens, we are constantly being asked who we are by the systems we use.
Typically, we are given a unique username for each system we use, often leading to confusion when we
forget who we are in a particular situation!
2. Authentication. These processes answer the question: ―How do I know it‘s you?‖ At a minimum, we are
required to provide a password, which may be as simple as our phone number but may also be a complex
combination of letters and numbers that we are required to change on a regular basis. Other, less commonly
used methods of authentication include: shared secrets (i.e., questions about yourself); biometrics (i.e.,
The or
Identity
Management
Challenge
fingerprint
iris scans);
or a file or swipe
card that works in combination with a password.
3. Authorization. These processes answer the question: ―What are you allowed to do or see?‖ and validate that
the user has the right to access a specific resource. As more and more detailed information is being made
available online (e.g., banking, medical records, intellectual property), this is becoming a crucial question for
both individuals and organizations. Companies and governments are now bound by legislation (varying in
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different parts of the world) to protect the information they collect, while individuals need to know that their
personal information is protected and will not be used for purposes they did not authorize. Both want to
ensure that criminals, profilers, hackers, and other unapproved users do not gain access to their information.
What is often less well-understood is the foundation of people, process, and technology on which identification,
authentication, and authorization are built. This provides the basis for trust in the IDM process itself and assurance
that the proper protections are in place [Doctorow, 2007]. Without trust that the IDM process provides effective
identification, authentication, and authorization, companies and individuals will not want to conduct business online.
Until quite recently, this organizational infrastructure has been buried deep within most IT organizations and their
applications. IT has been responsible for creating the processes, implementing the technology, and providing the
staff to undertake:
 IDM Administration. A large part of IDM work has traditionally involved registering and deregistering users of
IT systems and managing their passwords [Allan and Perkins, 2009]. For example, it has been estimated that
one-half of all Help Desk calls are for password resets [Waters, 200]. Administration also includes determining
what systems and information an individual is entitled to access and monitoring usage to ensure that no
unauthorized transactions take place.
 Information Privacy. Protecting personal privacy is closely linked to access control. Organizations need
practices in place to assure individuals that their information will be protected and ensure that it will be used
only when and where needed by persons authorized to do so.
 Security. Organizations must also protect their data from being lost or fraudulently accessed [Suess and
Morooney, 2009]. A strong identification, authentication, and authorization process can prevent most
unauthorized access not only to personal data, but also to corporate intellectual property by persons or
companies not known to the organization and to the applications that actually run the company. However, it
cannot prevent access by persons who are authorized to see this information and who use it inappropriately
or by unauthorized persons who get physical access to it (e.g., by walking into an office or hijacking an
identity). Thus, physical and virtual security goes beyond basic IDM practices.
 Risk. All IDM practices should be based on an assessment of the risk involved to both individuals and
organizations. The more electronic access an organization provides, the greater the risk of theft, fraud, and
disruption [Small, 2006]. Focus group members pointed out that the biggest risks are from insiders and
problems often arise through error rather than deliberate action. ―This is why we need to have very specific
access controls,‖ said one. ―There should be no generic internal IDs for anyone.‖ Clearly, there are levels of
risk based on a combination of the type of information involved, who is accessing it and under what
circumstances. There is little risk associated with a competitor accessing a company‘s cafeteria menu and
high risk in the same individual accessing its employee or client list. Thus, appropriate IDM needs to be linked
to the level of risk involved to provide the assurance that the right information protection is in place without
causing undue irritation or frustration with the controls being used.
 Regulatory Compliance. Finally, all organizations have legal responsibilities to properly identify and
authenticate users of their data and applications as well as those accessing their services [Smedlinghoff,
2008]. Compliance becomes increasingly challenging when companies hire external third parties to do work
for them. One manager noted that his company has to have legal oversight for all external access provided to
vendors and partners because his company is legally responsible for what happens to its data. Other
managers noted that they are legally required to review key transactions done by their employees, to have all
staff review acceptable use practices and to separate roles and responsibilities with respect to key
transactions.
While organizations still typically undertake their own identification, authentication, and authorization services, as
well as the underlying administration and other assessments, there is much discussion about how IDM could be
done differently and more effectively. Federated IDM is an approach that suggests that companies could agree to
trust their partners‘ IDM services and vouch for each other‘s users [Waters, 2007; Smedlinghoff, 2008]. Many of the
companies in the focus group are exploring doing this on a case-by-case basis, because managing identities
internally is becoming increasingly complex and challenging [Fest, 2008]. ―It‘s becoming unfeasible to own the
identity repository for every individual accessing our data,‖ said one manager. ―We need identity federation because
we don‘t want identity management to be our primary focus.‖ Other companies are exploring turning identity services
over to a trusted third party which would be able to develop a standardized approach to federation on behalf of a
number of companies. Unfortunately, there are still serious legal concerns to federation which have inhibited its use.
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The legal and compliance issues associated with federated IDM underscore one of the biggest challenges involved
in implementing any effective IDM—the complexities arising from the multiple interests of the stakeholders it serves.
Within a single organization, IT, legal, HR, and individual business units are all involved in its governance in the
focus group companies. Stakeholder considerations multiply exponentially when an organization opens itself up to
external access of any type. As one researcher notes: ―[IDM] is an intricate mix where … [p]arties might be
influenced by privacy desires and regulations, legal liability, security vulnerabilities…, enjoyment or productivity,
profit motives, application flexibility, and more. Some goals sit in uneasy tension with others‖ [Maler, 2009].

III. IDM AS A BUSINESS ENABLER
In the past IDM has been largely a technical matter and considered an internal IT function of limited interest to the
business. Today, however, IDM has become an essential business enabler, and with this transition has come not
only greater visibility for IDM but also a host of new issues for business and IT managers to collectively address.
Unfortunately, most business leaders are unaware of how much the IDM environment has changed recently [Kalin,
2005; Small, 2006; Neuenschwander, 2006]. ―For many years, identity management was exclusively an enterprise
proposition with an emphasis on security, authorization for resource access and institutional control of all aspects of
identity provisioning and usage‖ [Maler, 2009]. As a result, IDM has largely been seen by business as a technical
issue rather than as a business one [Wagner and Allan, 2009]. This perception is now slowly changing as
businesses run up against their internal IDM limitations, and IDM practices have been unable to respond effectively
to new business needs [Kho, 2009].
The focus group was unanimous about the need to see IDM as a business enabler. ―The business climate is
changing rapidly with competition from different sources, globalization and a mobile workforce. We need to be more
flexible about how we work with people and we need to work in ways we haven‘t before. So IDM is really a
foundation piece to enable business transformation,‖ said one manager. Another explained, ―The ROI for IDM is not
great, but we just need to do it; it‘s ‗table stakes‘ for us.‖ A third noted, ―Our failure to address the limitations of our
legacy IDM processes has become a real barrier to business transformation.‖
Unfortunately, the strong technical focus of many IDM specialists has obscured business‘ understanding of this
issue. As with other infrastructure projects, the need for funding has too often focused on nitty-gritty details without
explaining in business terms why IDM is so important [Kalin, 2005]. Focus group managers recognized this problem.
―We need an alternative approach to IDM based on business value,‖ said one manager. ―IDM is a ‗huge dilemma‘ for
us. Business is not taking ownership for it and IT is having to fund it on its own. But traditional approaches simply
don‘t work today,‖ said another.
What IT managers and increasingly, business leaders, are coming to understand, is that effective IDM, in
collaboration with security, is the means whereby organizations can balance their risk and flexibility needs and make
appropriate business decisions as they become more mobile, global, digital, and interconnected with customers and
other companies [Small, 2009; Shuey and West, 2006; Wagner and Allan, 2009]. In the risk:flexibility equation, the
risks of poor identity management are much better-known and described than the flexibility component. IDM risks
include fraud or identity theft; privacy and regulatory noncompliance; reputational loss resulting from information loss
or theft; and financial loss if customers and partners lose trust in an organization‘s ability to protect their information
[Shuey and West, 2006; Allan et al., 2009; Britt, 2009; Perkins, 2009]. The risk component of IDM was also more
widely incorporated in the practices of the focus group organizations as well. For example, one large organization
now has a Chief Information Security Officer who is responsible for IDM at the enterprise level. Another has
implemented processes to manage identity risks across several initiatives. Legal departments of their organizations
are also active in providing oversight for external partnering arrangements because companies are concerned about
who is using their data and who has access to their intellectual property. In short, as one manager stated, an
important organizational priority is to ―develop IDM capabilities that will enable us to work together without sacrificing
security or productivity.‖
Beyond risk management however, business enablement/flexibility is an equally important component of the IDM
value proposition. One manager stated, ―We need to be more flexible about how we work with people and to work in
ways we haven‘t worked before.‖ A composite list of business needs that require strong IDM compiled from the
focus group includes:





Support for a more mobile and global workforce
Speedier mergers and acquisitions
Increased linkages with partners and suppliers
The ability to deal with increasing volumes of information and present a consolidated view of data from across
many different systems
 Protection for massive amounts of data moving around the world and between companies
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Improved online customer service and customer access to information
Increased collaboration
More rapid access to external capabilities (e.g., outsourcing)
Addressing complex external relationships (e.g., a partner one day and a competitor the next; a partner in one
area and a competitor in another)

Table 1 illustrates how one focus group manager views the IDM risk:flexibility equation with respect to enabling
collaboration. Note that there is not a one:one correspondence between the services enabled and the risks involved,
further complicating the equation.






Table 1: Effective IDM Balances Business Flexibility and Risk Management
Enabling Collaboration
Managing Risk
Give users access to the  Ensure individuals are efficiently granted appropriate rights to
resources they need to be
resources and services
productive
 Ensure ONLY authorized individuals are granted access rights
Link business processes
 Monitor what authorized users are doing with their access to
across security boundaries
identify insider threats
Quickly roll out new services
 Be able to monitor, audit and report on the implementation and
to customers and partners
effectiveness of controls for compliance and regulatory purposes

Other business IDM needs relate to cost containment and productivity. In many cases, users are frustrated with
multiple sign-ons and complex and time-consuming security access processes that do not appear to add value
[Perkins, 2009; Kho, 2009; Maler, 2009]. Finally, many organizations want to provide improved customer
experiences, build customer and partner ecosystems, and facilitate new ways of working and remote access [Allan
et al., 2009; Small, 2009; Kho, 2009].

IV. IDM CHALLENGES FOR IT MANAGERS
Each of these business needs represents a series of IDM challenges for IT managers. Whereas in the past, IT has
been able to limit access to data and applications through building a secure firewall around an organization and thus
prohibiting external access, today‘s organizations are increasingly becoming more porous and are heading toward
complete deperimiterization [Maler, 2009]. ―As we increase the number of our strategic partnerships, IT becomes a
barrier without effective IDM,‖ said one manager. ―We don‘t want to become identity managers for everyone who
accesses our data,‖ said another. ―Therefore, we need to do IDM differently than we have been.‖
Managing IDM in a deperimiterized world means moving away from an IDM approach that is data and applicationcentric. In the legacy environment that most IT managers have inherited, IDM is managed on a system-by-system
basis [Waters, 2007]. As a result, users often have many usernames and passwords. One study found that 37
percent of enterprises have between seven to twelve passwords per employee and 12 percent have twelve or more
[Kho, 2009]. Thus, it is no surprise that even internally, managing user identities and entitlements has become
increasingly complex and that IDM in many organizations has become siloed and fragmented [Allan et al., 2009].
Furthermore, legacy systems often have numerous vulnerabilities and flaws, given that they were designed for a
firewalled world [Aitoro, 2008]. One focus group manager described her company‘s current state of IDM as follows:
We have no consolidated view of which employees have access to which assets. We cannot validate
access rights and privileges. Access is not revoked in a timely fashion when an employee changes jobs or
leaves. Our user administration is complex and overlapping and pre-employment checks cannot be
confirmed prior to granting information access to workers.
Many organizations are struggling with elevating IDM from being done by individual systems to being managed at an
enterprise level. As a starting point, focus group members were trying to develop enterprise policies and procedures
for both internal staff and external access. Developing the right processes and governance is critical, they stressed,
because of the risk:flexibility trade-offs involved. ―Our goal is to develop a single, enterprise ID,‖ said one manager,
―and to have one integrated, automated IDM lifecycle.‖
Unfortunately, such an integrated, enterprise process is still more of a goal than a reality. Organizations are
hampered in developing it by a number of factors. First, as noted above, there is limited business understanding of
the business benefits of effective IDM and thus, limited funding available for building the infrastructure and staffing
the process [Kho, 2009]. Second, governance is typically fragmented among IT, the business, HR, and legal
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departments [Maler, 2009; Wagner, 2009]. Third, current IDM practices and processes are often manual [Small,
2006]. Fourth, the security risks are increasing rapidly [Nash, 2009; Kho, 2009] and fifth, the number and type of
devices not provisioned by an organization (e.g., cell phones or laptops) and the number and type of remote or
external users needing access is increasing exponentially [Waters, 2007].
While IT managers are working on these internal challenges, they are poorly supported by the available
technologies, standards, and legal frameworks. Although IDM is about more than technology, tools can be useful in
many aspects of the lifecycle, including: administration, audit and analytics, authentication, and authorization.
Unfortunately, the available tools do not map well to these IDM functions, and there is considerable confusion about
their capabilities [Kreizman et al., 2009]. Many tools are proprietary, making it difficult to easily deploy IDM across
enterprise boundaries [Kho, 2009; Saran 2007]. These problems are exacerbated by a lack of common language,
standards, and accepted best practices in IDM [Neuenschwander, 2006; Kho, 2009]. As one focus group manager
noted, ―Without common standards and a common understanding of IDM principles, it is very difficult for
organizations to move forward and engage in federated IDM, though that is what we would all like to do.‖
Most countries‘ legal frameworks are also woefully lacking in numerous ways. One study found that there are no
universally-accepted standards of identity-proofing or common standards of what attributes should be used to
identify an individual or a business [Smith, 2007]. This means that every organization, and its legal department, is
left to determine what attributes it should collect for appropriate access control. Thus, in most focus group
companies, every external relationship must be manually configured and legal approval sought. ―We are held to be
legally accountable for who is using our data,‖ said one manager. Another noted, ―We must assess each vendor
individually regarding their standards and practices.‖ In some cases, organizations‘ legal obligations are unclear and,
in others, companies appear to be over-regulated, resulting in considerable confusion [Saran, 2007;
Neuenschwander, 2006; Smith, 2008]. Finally, for global companies, the challenge is even greater as they must
factor different countries‘ privacy laws into their access equations. ―In many cases, we must control what data leaves
a country, preventing global service providers from accessing certain kinds of data,‖ explained one manager. The
overall result is that legal concerns have meant that federated IDM has been much slower to take off than initially
expected and external access to company data and processes is still limited and largely manual.
Overall, managing access across an enterprise of any size at any deeper level than coarse access control is ―a
herculean effort‖ [Neuenschwander, 2006]. What‘s needed, according to the focus group, is a different approach to
IDM. ―At present, we have point products, point problems, fragmented policies and processes that simply don‘t work
for our business environment,‖ explained one manager. Others agree, ―the increased scale of network access today
exceeds the original models of IDM‖ [Small, 2006]. ―[The current] fragmented, siloed approach cannot meet the
needs for business agility in enterprises with ever-increasing numbers of internal and external users across
heterogeneous legacy, client/server, web and service-oriented architecture environments‖ [Allan et al., 2009].

V. PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE IDM IN THE FUTURE
Newer approaches to IDM are by no means well-established and there are still many gaps in our understanding
about how these might work. However, there are several principles to guide this development that are quite widely
accepted. These include:
 Approach IDM Holistically. Focus group managers agree that IDM should be an integrated part of an
organization‘s overall security framework that consists of several layers, each of which work together to create
an environment of trust and protection (see Figure 1). A layered approach provides multiple forms of back-up
protection in case vulnerabilities are detected, while integration ensures that practices are as efficient as
possible from both a user and a cost point of view. A comprehensive framework should support both internal
and external access, address governance and process as well as technical concerns, and integrate IDM into
policy-setting [Wagner and Alan, 2009; Suess and Morooney, 2009].
 Focus on Business Value. As noted above, the business-enabling elements of IDM can often get lost in the
technological jargon that too-often characterizes IDM plans and discussions [Smith, 2008]. There are several
elements of business value that should be considered in developing an IDM framework. First, IDM should be
designed to help make effective business decisions and manage the flexibility:risk trade-offs that are involved
[Small, 2006; Allan et al., 2009]. Second, it should reduce the cost of providing effective IDM [Small, 2009;
Perkins, 2009]. Third, it should increase trust both internally and externally in an organization‘s IDM practices
[Smith, 2007]. Fourth, it should support the development of electronic services, virtual and remote work, and
global sourcing [Wagner and Allan, 2009]. Finally, by streamlining IDM practices, it should enhance
productivity and adherence to acceptable-use policies [Maler, 2009; Kalin, 2005; Small, 2006].
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Figure 1. IDM Is Part of a Holistic Security Framework
 Adopt Standards Wherever Possible. It was widely-recognized in the focus group and elsewhere that
enterprise IDM should adhere to open standards in order to facilitate provisioning of cross-enterprise services
[Smith, 2008]. However, these standards are just beginning to be developed and are still far from being
broadly accepted [Saran, 2007; Kho, 2009]. Thus, at present, companies must largely create their own
standards—either on their own or within their industry. Several members of the focus group are participating
in standards-creating bodies that are designed to create small federated IDM environments in order to be able
to trust identities created within them. Similarly, other third party IDM services are beginning to emerge
[Neuenschwander, 2006; Fest, 2008]. It is, therefore, important for IT managers to monitor these
developments and to adopt standardized approaches as they become available.
 Develop a Roadmap. IDM is a rapidly evolving field [Allan et al., 2009]. Moving from traditional approaches to
newer and more effective ones will take time and require vision and the development of a roadmap
[Smedlinghof, 2008; Allan et al., 2009]. Such a roadmap would not only create the framework, policies, and
standards for IDM, it would also develop the processes and infrastructure required to achieve it. Streamlining
processes to structure IDM activities more effectively and eliminate duplication of effort is a good first step
[Allan et al., 2009]. Improved integration of business and IT IDM processes is another [Shuey and West,
2006]. Finally efforts need to be made to simplify security technology such as: developing a single sign on for
systems that links to user roles; segmenting data to enable more granular access; and improving monitoring
and reporting [Small, 2006; Kreizman et al., 2009]. Focus group members were at different stages of
developing such roadmaps but all were actively working on them.
 Decouple IDM—from Applications, Environments and Companies. The goal of newer approaches to IDM is to
abstract it from specific entities. Clearly, it must be decoupled from individual applications so that it can be
managed holistically. However, it must also make identities portable across systems, technical environments,
and devices [Smedlinghoff, 2008; Small, 2006]. And, it must be designed to rapidly connect (and disconnect)
users and partners as required [Perkins, 2009; Wagner and Allan, 2009]. Some newer approaches to IDM are
user-centric, putting customers at the centre of IDM by making them owners of their own data rather than
many different companies. These approaches use identity management services that act as identity
containers and provide proof of identity to companies as permitted by a customer, who can choose what
information to release to a company [Maler, 2009]. While there is agreement that such IDM services are not
yet practical for most companies, decoupling IDM as much as possible from proprietary practices is good
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preparation for the direction that most observers (and the focus group) believe that IDM is headed [Maler,
2009; Kho, 2009; Djordjevic and Dimitrakos, 2005].

VI. MOVING FORWARD WITH IDM: ADVICE FOR IT MANAGERS
No IT manager or business leader should ever underestimate the challenges involved in IDM as the field struggles
to keep up with our increasingly networked, global, and mobile world. Members of the focus group had several
recommendations for other IT managers about how to begin moving toward the next level of IDM. These include:
 Identify IDM Needs and Set Policy. An important step in evolving IDM is to better understand the
organization‘s needs for IDM both internally and externally. As noted above, there is no standard list of
identity attributes or an external identity management body, so organizations are forced to fend for
themselves in determining acceptable internal and external authentication; layers of authentication, such as
situational or corporate access; IDM triggers, such as changing jobs or adding a new vendor; and the level of
granularity of access that is desirable. Understanding IDM needs is fundamental to establishing access
policies and to developing effective IDM processes, stated the focus group managers.
 Address IDM Process and Governance. It is widely accepted that many organizations have inadequate and
immature IDM processes [Allan et al., 2009; Kho, 2009; Suess and Morooney, 2009]. Many focus group
members were in the process of assessing the current state of their IDM and determining their strategy and
vision for adapting it to meet their needs. One manager explained her organization‘s IDM goals as: ―We want
to have one enterprise ID; one integrated, automated full lifecycle process; one (or a very few) sign-ons; one
book of record; and improved compliance, service, and productivity.‖ Other focus group managers were
concentrating on improving the process for external access. ―We need a process for assessing vendor IDM
practices,‖ said one. Another was looking at how to recognize external identities from trusted third parties. All
these processes need governance, and business ownership of IDM was viewed as essential to making the
right decisions about how the flexibility:risk tradeoffs are handed. ―The trouble in our organization is that we
have no overall owner,‖ said one manager. ―Ownership is split between IT, operations, and our lines of
business.‖ A single leader and clarity about roles and responsibilities was deemed essential to improving.
Another manager added, ―We need to make process changes to get the sequence of events right, and we
need to reengineer our workforce management process to better integrate with our IDM process.‖ Viewing
IDM as a lifecycle can be useful in helping to develop and manage an improved process (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. The IDM Lifecycle
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 Integrate IDM with Architecture. IDM technology is an important component of any organization‘s approach to
IDM, stated the focus group, but only if it is combined with effective processes and behavioural changes. Most
of the technical challenges involved stem from poor systems integration and a lack of standards. These can
best be addressed by an organization‘s architecture group as it plans and designs how applications and
infrastructure will evolve. Clearly, IDM should also be integrated with the organization‘s security framework
and many enterprises are working to extract IDM from their applications and develop a single enterprise signon that is linked to access and other controls. In the longer term, most focus group organizations are hoping
that IDM will eventually become a service that is provided by a third party or which is jointly owned by a
federation of related organizations. While this has not been widely implemented at present, architects and
security specialists should be aware of standards developments and any initiatives in their industry to share
identity information.
 Incorporate Traceability and Auditability. What is often overlooked in considering IDM is the back end of the
lifecycle process, including monitoring accounts, user activity and compliance reporting. Increasingly, these
activities are becoming part of legal and regulatory best practices. Focus group managers noted that a
significant amount of their time is now devoted to this work and that new tools and policies are needed in this
area. ―The top three threats to enterprise security are insider-related,‖ stated one manager. These include
employee error, data theft, and insider sabotage. Overall, insider fraud costs U.S. companies over $600 billion
annually [Small, 2009]. To address these risks, many managers have been given new oversight roles and
responsibilities but inadequate processes and tools to help them. ―IDM has created work for me that I never
expected,‖ explained a manager. ―I now receive several messages a day to revalidate transactions that are
being done by my staff. Every executive has a responsibility to review what is being done.‖ Some of the
monitoring that is now considered important includes monitoring the volume of user activity, monitoring the
types and locations of activities, and ensuring activities are properly segregated to prevent fraud. Finally,
reports must also demonstrate compliance with all regulations and laws. Ideally, as much of this work as
possible should be automated, while governance and processes also need to be designed to effectively
incorporate these new requirements for IDM.

VII. CONCLUSION
Identity management is a huge and constantly changing challenge for organizations. IT managers must balance the
substantial risks involved in becoming increasingly networked and opening their firewalls to clients and partners with
the resulting business value delivered. Like so much else in IT, effective IDM must be viewed from both a business
and a technical lens and requires business leaders to be actively involved in taking ownership of the decisions
involved. There is no straightforward and easy-to-implement solution for IDM. As a result, IT managers are all too
often caught between a rock and a hard place—either being seen as the obstacle to business transformation or
having to take ―bet the company‖ risks with inadequate data and access controls. However, they do themselves no
favour by failing to articulate IDM issues in business terms when speaking with business leaders. It is, therefore,
incumbent on all organizational leaders to work together to continuously evolve a practical and holistic framework
that will ensure that their IDM practices keep up with both the opportunities and the risks of a transforming world.
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